Common modifications include:(i)tuning attack parameters (e.g., number ofsteps),(ii)replacing network components to simplify the attack (e.g., removing randomization or non-differentiable components), and(iii) replacing the loss function optimized by the attack.

Existing defenses attempt to bolster the resilience of GNNs using diverse approaches.

As introduced in 2, attacks may perturb the adjacency matrixA, the feature matrixX, or both.

Not surprisingly, we show that none of the assessed models are as robust as originally advertised in their respective papers.

The query-based black-box attacks have raised serious threats to machine learning models in many real applications. In this work, we study a lightweight defense method, dubbed Random Noise Defense (RND), which adds proper Gaussian noise to each query. We conduct the theoretical analysis about the effectiveness of RND against query-based black-box attacks and the corresponding adaptive attacks. Our theoretical results reveal that the defense performance of RND is determined by the magnitude ratio between the noise induced by RND and the noise added by the attackers for gradient estimation or local search. The large magnitude ratio leads to the stronger defense performance of RND, and it's also critical for mitigating adaptive attacks. Based on our analysis, we further propose to combine RND with a plausible Gaussian augmentation Fine-tuning (RND-GF). It enables RND to add larger noise to each query while maintaining the clean accuracy to obtain a better trade-off between clean accuracy and defense performance. Additionally, RND can be flexibly combined with the existing defense methods to further boost the adversarial robustness, such as adversarial training (AT). Extensive experiments on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet verify our theoretical findings and the effectiveness of RND and RND-GF.

Machine learning is a key tool for Android malware detection, effectively identifying malicious patterns in apps. However, ML-based detectors are vulnerable to evasion attacks, where small, crafted changes bypass detection. Despite progress in adversarial defenses, the lack of comprehensive evaluation frameworks in binary-constrained domains limits understanding of their robustness. We introduce two key contributions. First, Prioritized Binary Rounding, a technique to convert continuous perturbations into binary feature spaces while preserving high attack success and low perturbation size. Second, the sigma-binary attack, a novel adversarial method for binary domains, designed to achieve attack goals with minimal feature changes. Experiments on the Malscan dataset show that sigma-binary outperforms existing attacks and exposes key vulnerabilities in state-of-the-art defenses. Defenses equipped with adversary detectors, such as KDE, DLA, DNN+, and ICNN, exhibit significant brittleness, with attack success rates exceeding 90% using fewer than 10 feature modifications and reaching 100% with just 20. Adversarially trained defenses, including AT-rFGSM-k, AT-MaxMA, improves robustness under small budgets but remains vulnerable to unrestricted perturbations, with attack success rates of 99.45% and 96.62%, respectively. Although PAD-SMA demonstrates strong robustness against state-of-the-art gradient-based adversarial attacks by maintaining an attack success rate below 16.55%, the sigma-binary attack significantly outperforms these methods, achieving a 94.56% success rate under unrestricted perturbations. These findings highlight the critical need for precise method like sigma-binary to expose hidden vulnerabilities in existing defenses and support the development of more resilient malware detection systems.

Indirect prompt injection attacks (IPIAs), where large language models (LLMs) follow malicious instructions hidden in input data, pose a critical threat to LLMpowered agents. In this paper, we present IntentGuard, a general defense framework based on instruction-following intent analysis. The key insight of Intent-Guard is that the decisive factor in IPIAs is not the presence of malicious text, but whether the LLM intends to follow instructions from untrusted data. Building on this insight, IntentGuard leverages an instruction-following intent analyzer (IIA) to identify which parts of the input prompt the model recognizes as actionable instructions, and then flag or neutralize any overlaps with untrusted data segments. To instantiate the framework, we develop an IIA that uses three "thinking intervention" strategies to elicit a structured list of intended instructions from reasoning-enabled LLMs. These techniques include start-of-thinking prefilling, end-of-thinking refinement, and adversarial in-context demonstration. We evaluate IntentGuard on two agentic benchmarks (AgentDojo and Mind2Web) using two reasoning-enabled LLMs (Qwen-3-32B and gpt-oss-20B). Results demonstrate that IntentGuard achieves (1) no utility degradation in all but one setting and (2) strong robustness against adaptive prompt injection attacks (e.g., reducing attack success rates from 100% to 8.5% in a Mind2Web scenario). Indirect prompt injection attacks (IPIAs) (Greshake et al., 2023), where large language models (LLMs) follow malicious instructions hidden in the input data, have emerged as a top security concern for LLM-powered agents. Although many defenses have been proposed, each faces fundamental limitations. Finetuning-based defenses (Chen et al., 2024; 2025b) are costly and lack interpretability; auxiliary classifiers for IPIA detection Shi et al. (2025); Hung et al. (2024) often fail to generalize and are vulnerable to adaptive attacks; system-level rule enforcement Debenedetti et al. (2025) can impact agent utility while offering little robustness against attacks that do not alter control and data flows (e.g., injecting misinformation or phishing links into an email summary). In this paper, we approach the prompt injection problem from a new perspective: instruction-following intent analysis. For an LLM to effectively follow instructions, it must have an internal mechanism to decide which parts of a prompt it recognizes as actionable instructions.